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13th Annual Conference on European Tort Law*
ANDREW BELL & THOMAS THIEDE**
After some warm words of welcome from Georg Kathrein, Department Head of 
Civil Law at the Austrian Ministry of Justice, followed by those of Ernst Karner, 
Acting Director of the Institute for European Tort Law of the Austrian Academy 
of Sciences and the University of Graz (ETL), the conference began, as the 
conference is wont to begin, with a keynote lecture by a luminary of the tort law 
world, a session chaired this year by Ken Oliphant, former Director of the 
Institute and Professor of Tort Law in Bristol (United Kingdom). As all private 
law aficionados know, we can at times be left powerless when force majeure strikes 
- as it did for the opening of this year’s Annual Conference. Due to unforeseen 
circumstances, Simon Whittaker was not able to attend the conference and deliver 
his keynote lecture.1 A worthy replacement was found, however, in Helmut 
Koziol, who delivered a lecture entitled ‘Law of Torts and ‘Schadenersatzrecht1 
instead.
K oziols argument consisted of a number of stages, first seeking to 
establish that really significant differences between the (commonly equated) law of 
torts and Schadenersatzrecht as bodies of law in their respective systems exist and, 
second, considering some difficult consequences arising from the distinction and 
a failure to appreciate it. His conclusion was that great care needs to be taken 
when considering taking instruments from the law of torts for introduction into a 
body of law that, in the continental tradition, is designed around a uniform 
concept of damage compensation - the entire context should be considered and 
the development of separate legal instruments must be contemplated in order to 
avoid introducing contradictions or fractures into the system.
On the question of the distinctions between the two concepts, Koziol 
(leaving aside the question of the inclusion of contractual liability in 
Schadenersatzrecht) emphasized that the law of torts, in contrast with 
Schadenersatzrecht, is often (though not invariably) discussed entirely in terms of 
the rules establishing liability, with the remedial consequences separated. 
Furthermore, and more seriously, in Schadenersatzrecht a defined legal 
consequence - the compensation of damage - is given as the result where the 
relevant grounds for imputation (e.g., fault) and causation are established,
* 24 April to 26 April 2014, Vienna, Austria.
* *  Andrew Bell, University of Birmingham; Thomas Thiede, Austrian Academy of Sciences and 
University of Graz.
1 Simon Whittaker’s lecture (Opting into Tort) will still be published in JETL (Journal o f European 
Tort Law).
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whereas in the law of torts the myriad torts with varying prerequisites each raise 
the question of legal consequences afresh - not all torts even require damage to 
begin with and, as Ken Oliphant has noted, the roughly 70 torts could be seen to 
give 70 different conceptions of damage.
Koziol then went on to consider whether in fact ‘damage’ in 
Schadenersatzrecht is really so uniform as at first appears, or indeed the law of 
torts so heterogeneous, drawing upon the distinctions between pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary damages and different notions of damage (e.g., natural, legal, 
economic and positive damage, and loss of profit) in continental jurisprudence, 
and the question of whether a legal infringement can itself be ‘damage' in tort 
(also noting on the latter point the Italian ‘danno biologico’, now in disuse, and 
the Austrian objective-abstract assessment of damage, which nevertheless requires 
real damage). He concluded that these issues did not alter the basic proposition. 
It is clear in any event, said Koziol, that the existence of torts ‘actionable per se’ 
demonstrates that tort is not always directed at the compensation of damage, and 
this is emphasized by the absence of a rei vindicatio action and the existence of 
the tort of conversion - an ‘astonishing categorization’ of the owner’s protection 
under tort.
On the subject of the dangerous consequences, Koziol maintained that 
these differences have impacted the development of European harmonization 
projects, introducing surprising contradictions into, for example, the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference; Article 1:102 of Book VI (‘Non-contractual liability 
arising out of damage caused to another'2) of that instrument provides, despite 
the title and further content of that Book, for a right of prevention where damage 
is merely impending. This and a number of other examples show, for Koziol, the 
worrying disruption of a uniform area, centred on the compensation of damage, 
by virtue of the introduction of ideas from the law of torts without proper regard 
for the full context of those inspirational ideas in the common law. More 
worryingly still, argued Koziol, this is spreading, and there is a tendency in some 
quarters to upset the long-established consensus on the damage compensation 
paradigm in national discourse.
As one would expect, the lecture was met with enthusiastic discussion and 
a few of the points may be reiterated here. Ken Oliphant expanded briefly on the 
historical development of the two long-standing theories in the common law world 
on the nature of the law of ‘tort’ or ‘torts’ and what might be encompassed by the 
term. Reiner Schulze (Münster) addressed problems in German law; he argued 
that there, too, the borderline between injunctions and restitution seems to be 
blurred and so-called ‘Gewinnabschöpfung' (disgorgement of profits) causes 
problems of categorization. Koziol responded that the systematic argument must
2 Emphasis added.
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inevitably lead to the conclusion that ‘ Gewinnabschopjung is a question of the 
law of restitution. Ina Ebert (Kiel) raised doubts over some of K oziols arguments. 
First, Germans would understand ‘Schadenersatzrecht as simply the norms in 
sections 249 et seq.Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), which are not related to the 
law of torts but the assessment of damages generally, as contrasted with the 
‘ unerlaubten Handlungen in sections 823 et seq. BGB (Koziol agreed that this is 
so in Germany but noted that he had used the term ‘Schadenersatzrecht in the 
sense he had for the sake of the broader comparative argument). Second, even 
within these ‘ unerlaubten Handlungen , certain actions, such as the invasion of 
personality rights, involve no damage. As regards this second argument, Koziol 
remarked that only the compensatory function should count, and German judges 
and academics would be well advised to avoid further extensions by allowing 
comparable ‘ torts actionable per se’. Ulrich Magnus (Hamburg) welcomed 
Koziol’s analysis and added that due regard must also be had for the social 
functions of the legal instrument and procedural law. Further food for thought 
was added by Jean-Sebastien Borghetti (Paris), asking whether, given the 
compensatory social function of tort law, additional regimes such as social 
security or compensation funds must also necessarily be added to the enquiry. The 
present authors have the privilege of adding here that Koziol’s research, as well as 
that of the Institute of European Tort Law and the European Centre of Tort and 
Insurance Law, has not neglected this issue but has previously contributed several 
volumes in the area.3
The Friday session of the conference sees a grande marche through the 
conference’s national reports, including each of the Member States of the 
European Union (EU) and a variety of non-Member States, too. Speakers are 
given the remit to produce and present a summary of one of the significant 
developments in the law of tort (or perhaps Schadenersatzrecht) from their 
respective jurisdictions in the preceding year. The significant challenge of doing 
so is testament to the indubitable skill of the presenters, whose full reports on 
tort developments may, as ever, be admired and appreciated in the annual 
European Tort Law Yearbook. The following can present but a tantalizing 
snapshot.
Play commenced in the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshoj - 
OGH) with its former President, Irmgard Griss, in the chair and Barbara C. 
Steininger presenting for Austria at the lectern. The OGH, it was explained, had 
handed down judgment in an interesting, though tragic, case on limitation 
periods. The claimant had been a pupil at a seminary boarding school operated by 
the defendant abbey, and had been the victim of sexual abuse perpetrated by the
3 See, inter alia, U. M a g n u s  (ed.), The Impact of Social Security Law on Tort Law  (Springer, 2003) 
and W.H. V a n  bo o m  & M. F a u r e  (eds), Shifts in Compensation between Private and Public 
Systems (Springer, 2007).
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head of boarders at that school in 1982. Only in 2012 did the claimant discover 
that the defendant had known when appointing the abuser to that position that he 
had already abused children. The absolute 30-year prescription period had not 
expired, but the short period of three years was in dispute. On the basis that a 
claimant needs to know all of the circumstances that justify a claim of wrongful 
conduct against a given defendant (including the wrongdoer’s identity), the court 
held that the period had not expired, having begun to run only when the claimant 
became aware of the abbey’s culpable violation of duty in 2012. This, Steininger 
eloquently explained, accords with the idea underlying the short limitation period 
that full protection be denied to those who neglect their interests by failing to 
avail themselves of remedies - failing to exercise a right is not neglect while 
exercise remains impossible.
Isabelle Durant from Belgium took the stage next and presented a pyramid 
scheme fraud case from the Belgian Cour de cassation concerning the liability of 
principals in agency. The decision affirmed (after two conflicting judgments in the 
early 1990s and contrary to the decision of the trial judge in the present case) that 
a victim in bad faith (here, the victim, a bank client, knew or had to know that the 
bank transactions at issue were irregular, because, inter alia, of the 10% p.a. 
interest rate) of a fraudulent agent in abuse of her office (here, the bank’s 
director) is not excluded from claiming under Article 1384(3) Code Civil against 
the agent’s principal (here, the bank). The case, said Durant, is rather to be 
viewed in terms of contributory negligence, given the significant impact a good 
faith requirement, not provided for in the law, would have on the Belgian 
jurisprudence.
Christian Takoff took to the stage for Bulgaria, discussing a problem 
relating to insurers’ recourse claims against insured tortfeasors where a limitation 
clause between the victim and the tortfeasor indirectly limits the insurer’s claim. 
Takoff considered whether a logical application of the res inter alios acta doctrine 
could resolve the limitation difficulty, concluding not; on the one hand, one could 
conclude that the insurer should remain unaffected by the limitation between the 
victim and tortfeasor, or else on the other that it is the insurance contract that 
should be seen as res inter alios acta and the tortfeasor left unaffected by it. This 
‘collision of equal values’ renders no solution. Takoff addressed a number of 
further issues, delineating factors that weigh in favour of the insurer or 
tortfeasor, and left his audience to come to their own conclusion. These included, 
first, potential abusive uses of limitation clauses by tortfeasors, whether the 
insurer’s right of recourse is ‘sacred’, the insurer’s due diligence in negotiations, 
and the cujus commode ejus incommode rule whereby the insurer deals with the 
risk of the profession and thus should be ready to take it. Although no solution is 
clear, a limitation of recourse claims in the cases addressed may very well keep 
prices stable and it may well be worthwhile to keep the problem, and indeed 
Bulgarian insurance markets, on the radar.
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As Croatia had joined the EU during the report year, the organizers made 
arrangements for a presentation from that jurisdiction, a task undertaken by 
Marko Baretic with aplomb. Baretic, having had a great wealth of developments to 
choose from in 2013, introduced the new Croatian Protection of the Environment 
Act, which provides for a two-tier liability system in the environmental field, 
under which the operators of dangerous activities now face strict liability, while 
the operators of non-dangerous activities are liable on a fault basis (albeit with a 
presumption of fault and (unusually) a presumption of unlawfulness). Thereafter, 
Baretic went on to discuss a ruling from the Constitutional Court on the subject 
of damages for immaterial losses for a tort victim's immediate family and the 
interpretation of ‘especially severe disability’.
Jiri Hradek ventured into the nexus between family law, property law, and 
tort law and presented a case on the liability of spouses for damage caused by a 
deceased tortfeasor in the Czech Republic. The claimant, a guarantee fund of the 
Czech Bureau of Insurers, claimed by way of a recourse action around EUR 
30,000 from the widow of a traffic accident tortfeasor - the deceased had lacked 
the appropriate, compulsory liability insurance at the time of the accident in 
which he himself died. At trial, it was held that the husband had acquired the 
vehicle alone with money given to him by his parents, and not being part of the 
common spousal property, obligations arising from it also formed no part of the 
common property. The defendant widow could thus not be held liable in respect 
of damage caused by the car. In the Supreme Court, however, it was stressed that 
delictual obligations arise independently of the property (being dependent on the 
will) and the delictual obligation at issue arose during the husband’s lifetime. At 
that point, it became part of the common property of the spouses for which the 
defendant widow could now be held liable.
For Denmark, S0ren Bergenser submitted a case on workplace injuries, 
with a break in the decades-long tendency of Danish courts to favour 
compensation. A female teacher had incurred a back injury after having to avoid 
colliding with a student who was running towards her chasing a ball. The teacher 
claimed damages from the National Board (Arbejdsskadestyrelsen), but the claim 
was rejected, as the physical impact between student and teacher was deemed 
insufficiently serious to cause the actual injury. The Danish Supreme Court 
referred to the Medico Legal Council (MLC) to assess the causal nexus between 
impact and back injury; the latter found that the impact could indeed have caused 
the injury, but, as the teacher was already suffering several degenerative changes 
in her back, the main cause seemed to be the teacher's own prior disposition for 
developing such injury. The Supreme Court found that the connection between 
impact and injury was insufficient for the teacher's claim and that the impact did 
not in itself amount to an injury for the purposes of the industrial injury scheme. 
Unsurprisingly, the decision did not meet with Bergenser's approval, as the 
new-found minimum extent or seriousness requirement will be impossible to 
assess and clearly violates the rule in place where a workplace accident
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exacerbates a pre-existing injury. It remains to be seen whether the case 
represents an incorrectly decided anomaly or the start of a new judicial trend.
Annette Morris took a negligence case as the subject for her presentation 
on England and Wales. In Woodland v. Essex County Council [2013] UKSC 66, 
the 10-year-old claimant attended a school under the control of Essex County 
Council (ECC). As part of the National Curriculum, the school provided 
swimming lessons, held off-site during school hours, which were outsourced to an 
independent contractor. The claimant suffered severe brain damage during one 
such lesson and pursued claims against several parties, including ECC, which 
accepted that it owed Woodland a duty to take reasonable care in respect of its 
own acts (i.e., in selecting the independent contractor) but argued against the 
imposition of vicarious liability for the acts of the independent contractor (which 
was uninsured) and denied that it owed Woodland a ‘non-delegable' duty to 
ensure the careful provision of the outsourced lessons. The non-delegable duty 
question was pursued as a preliminary issue, and both the High Court and the 
Court of Appeal rejected the claim on that count as bound to fail. The Supreme 
Court unanimously allowed an appeal. In their reasoning, their Lordships noted 
that non-delegable duties are inconsistent with fault-based negligence but held 
that they are fair, just, and reasonable in cases with the following features: (1) the 
claimant is especially vulnerable or dependent on the protection of the defendant 
(particularly patients and children); (2) there is a prior relationship between the 
claimant and defendant that places the claimant in the care of the defendant and 
through which the defendant assumes a positive duty to protect the claimant from 
harm; (3) the claimant has no control over how the defendant performs that duty; 
(4) the defendant delegated a function that is part of its positive duty towards the 
claimant to a third party; (5) the third party was negligent in the exercise of that 
delegated function (not in a collateral respect). Morris stressed the focus on 
control of the claimant as the essential element, and the Supreme Court's view 
that the resultant liability was not open-ended and so would not have the ‘chilling 
effect' feared in the lower courts.
A new car insurance law had been enacted in Estonia, to come into force in 
the autumn of 2014, and appeared in Irene Kull's presentation. In this new 
legislation, a conceptual change in motor insurance took place; the victim is now 
allowed, in certain circumstances, to file a claim against his or her own insurer. 
That insurer, after compensating the victim, may then proceed against the insurer 
of the person who caused the damage. It seems noteworthy that compensation for 
non-pecuniary damage remains rather modest; the maximum compensation sum 
for severe injury in motor accident contexts is capped at EUR 3,200. This is, 
however, still a significant improvement on the previous EUR 640. A traffic 
accident also formed the subject of one of several cases explored by Kull (No. 
3-2-1-7-13, 19 March 2013) and one that represented a development in a number 
of respects, not least of which being that the requirements for operating a vehicle 
were fulfilled with a stationary car.
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In Finland, a problem of state liability in the context of European law was 
the subject of Paivi Tiilikka's presentation. A limited liability company, which 
was not liable for value-added tax (VAT), had brought a used car from Belgium to 
Finland in 2003. In addition to the car tax, the company had been ordered to pay 
VAT that was based on the car tax. Unsurprisingly, the company appealed, failed, 
and paid the tax, only subsequently to sue the Finnish state on the basis of 
discriminatory treatment and a breach of EU law, as the Finnish state was aware 
that this tax was problematic in relation to Union law - a judgment on this 
question had already be given by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (C-101/00, 
Siilin and C-10/08). According to that decision, VAT based on car tax was 
discriminatory and in conflict with EU law, violating the prohibition on 
discriminatory taxation (Art. 110 Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU)). The Finnish Supreme Court concurred and, referring to Cases 
C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur, held the Finnish State liable. 
Tiilikka also discussed the Supreme Court’s use of the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights in a number of defamation cases over the last 
year.
For France, Michel Sejean chose the overarching theme of prevention for 
his presentation on the Law of 16 April 2013 on Independent Expert Reporting in 
matters of Health and Environment and on the Protection of Whistle-Blowers (an 
interesting area, in particular with respect to the importance of the compensation 
of damage in Koziol's keynote address, discussed above). According to Sejean, the 
law will further the reliance on whistle-blowers and experts and reduce the 
reaction time of authorities by establishing (symbolically, perhaps - for Sejean 
the protection of free expression already covers this) clear protection for 
whistle-blowers in the (connected) fields of health and the environment. A new 
authority will also be established to provide guidelines for experts delivering 
opinions in these areas - and force other public authorities thereby to take 
warnings seriously while protecting whistle-blowers as well.
As in recent years, Florian Wagner-von Papp addressed the issue of 
infringements of personality rights in Germany in the so-called ‘auto-complete’ 
case. In April 2009, Google introduced the ‘auto-complete function’ into its 
search engine, which makes suggestions based on past user searches. This has led 
to litigation where the auto-complete suggestions following the entry of a name 
falsely indicate an association with illegal, immoral, or otherwise socially 
disfavoured behaviour, as with Bettina Wulff, Germany’s former first lady 
(auto-complete introducing the term ‘prostitute’). The Wulff case attracted 
worldwide attention.4 Those proceedings were stayed awaiting judgment in 
another case concerning ‘auto-complete' in the Federal Court of Justice. Here, a
4 See N. KULISH, ‘As Google Fills in Blank, a German Cries Foul’ , The New York Times, 19 Sep. 
2012, p A4.
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nutritional supplement and cosmetics distributing corporation (the first claimant) 
using a ‘network-marketing system’ (multilevel marketing) and its founder and 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (the second claimant) sued Google on the basis of 
defamation; when the full name of the second claimant was entered into Google, 
the auto-complete suggestions were ‘fraud’ and ‘Scientology’. In contrast to the 
lower courts, the Federal Court of Justice considered the effect of the 
auto-complete content to be more substantial as users expect, or at least consider 
possible, an inherent connection between the search term and the suggestions, 
potentially rendering Google liable for infringing personality rights. However, the 
Court considered the key point to be the omission to remove defamatory 
suggestions rather than the act of suggesting connected search terms. Google 
does not have to prevent the occurrence of defamatory auto-complete suggestions 
ex ante but has to investigate possible infringements once notified and ‘take 
down' infringing suggestions. The question then is the extent of Google's duty to 
investigate an infringement of personality rights once notice is given. The Court 
remanded the case to the Higher Regional Court for an assessment of whether 
Google complied with its duty to investigate an infringement of the claimant's 
personality rights.
Eugenia Dacoronia, Greece, presented a case on an old favourite of the 
Annual Conference - wrongful birth. The claimants were married and expecting 
their first child. The wife, in her 21st week of pregnancy, was given an ultrasound 
that detected a distended bowel in the foetus (echogenic bowel). This can be an 
indication of Down’s syndrome or cystic fibrosis in a foetus. The claimants, 
advised by the medical professionals that foetuses suffering from cystic fibrosis 
‘are not left to be born' and that they and the foetus should receive a molecular 
test for the disease (with the option to terminate), agreed to such a test. The test 
was performed by the defendants who, due to their negligence, did not discover 
that the parents were carriers of cystic fibrosis or that the foetus was suffering 
from it. The parents were consequently not informed of the disease's presence and 
there was no termination. Once the child was born with the disease, the parents 
filed an action claiming for their moral harm in the violation of their personality 
right, alleging that they would have terminated the pregnancy if they had been 
informed by the doctors. The Greek Supreme Court, taking into account the 
circumstances, the kind and the extent of the infringement of their rights and its 
consequences, the culpability of the defendants, and the social and financial status 
of the litigants, awarded EUR 250,000 to each spouse. The Court held that the 
protection of the personality under Article 57 of the Greek Civil Code (GCC) 
encompasses all goods related to the human being, such as health (public and 
personal), honour, private life and the sphere of secrecy, all external 
distinguishing elements of the person (name, image), and physical and emotional 
integrity. The emotional element of health can also be violated by an unlawful act 
directed against another person closely related to the sufferer of grief and pain. 
Moreover, held the Court, obstructing a pregnant woman in the exercise of her
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legal right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy when this is permitted by 
law constitutes a violation of her personality rights in the sense of Article 57 
GCC. A claim can also be raised by the husband, because the decision to 
terminate is a joint decision within a marriage, and moreover, the close 
relationship with the pregnant woman means that the adverse consequences on 
her personality are also felt by her husband.
In Hungary, a new Civil Code came into force and several of its provisions 
were discussed. According to Attila Menyhard, the Code may not in itself be 
revolutionary (being predominantly aimed at incorporating modern case law 
developments), but some aspects, and particularly in tort law, warrant very close 
inspection. This may be true for the new rule for awarding compensation for 
wrongful interferences with inherent rights of persons, and the fact that, with the 
new Code, non-pecuniary damages are no longer awarded in the Hungarian legal 
system. According to Menyhard, the legislator proceeded on the presumption that 
all compensable harm can be described as either material loss, interference with 
inherent rights of persons (‘pain and suffering’, ‘Schmerzensgeld - after a 
question from Monika Hinteregger, Menyhard clarified that inherent rights here 
means personality rights), or breach of a travel contract. Immaterial disadvantages 
that cannot be described as interferences with inherent rights of persons are no 
longer to be compensated. Obviously, these changes result in problems where 
harm or manifest disadvantage is not required (not even emotional distress) by 
law and no de minimis limit exists. Moreover, according to the new Code, a causal 
link will not be established in connection with losses that were not and ought not 
to have been foreseen by the tortfeasor. This results in difficulties in the context 
of negligence, where it is unclear whether the loss or the risk is required to be 
foreseen.
Reporting on Ireland, Eoin Quill introduced a case on an overeager (to say 
the least) debt collector in Sullivan v. Boylan (No 2) [2013] IEHC 104. In this 
case, the claimant Sullivan had a dispute with, and overpayment for building work 
carried out by, Boylan. The latter hired a debt collector who made unpleasant 
phone calls, sent text messages and e-mails, parked his van outside her house, 
and eventually threatened to put up a sign displaying the details of the debt and 
make house calls around the neighbourhood. Sullivan suffered mental distress 
(though no medical harm was proven) and claimed on the basis of this against the 
original builder, Boylan. In court, there was no doubt that the debt collector’s 
behaviour constituted unlawful harassment under the criminal law, but the private 
law actions of private nuisance, breach of statutory duty, and the Wilkinson v. 
Downton tort were deemed unsuitable. The court thus resorted to an action for 
breach of constitutional rights and awarded EUR 15,000 in general damages and 
EUR 7,500 in exemplary damages. According to Quill, this extension of breach of 
constitutional rights was not necessary, as a private nuisance claim should, in 
fact, have been available, given the claimant's ownership of the dwelling where
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the harassment was carried out (as well as, potentially, the Wilkinson v. Downton 
claim, there being no authority against such an extension).5
In Italy, questions concerning restoration in kind and causation were raised 
in the context of a case presented by Elena Bargelli. The claimant (Cir) and the 
defendant (Fininvest) were in dispute over control of a third company 
(Mondadori) in the 1980s, with the claimant s arguments resting on the 
corruption of a judge in the Rome Court of Appeal (there was already a criminal 
judgment against the judge). Seeking damages for the lost chance to take over 
Mondadori, the claimant alleged that, had the judge not been corrupted, a 
decision on the validity of an arbitration agreement would have been made in its 
favour and it would not have entered into the bad compromise it did subsequently 
with the defendant. The Tribunal and the Court of Appeal of Milan awarded the 
economic damages sought, and these judgments were upheld on appeal to the 
Cassazione. For Bargelli, the case involved numerous key questions: whether a 
claim for damages is permissible where the claimant would be allowed to claim 
restoration in kind (the decision of the Tribunal of Rome could be overturned); 
whether the compromise agreed between the parties prevents any judicial claim 
(res litigiosa transacta); and whether there was a sufficient causal link between the 
decision and the economic damage. The Cassazione held that the revocation, 
aimed at restoration of the status quo ante, had no relevance in the present case 
as restitution in integrum was impossible, invoking, further, the right to an 
effective remedy as justifying compensation for damage in these circumstances. 
The compromise agreement did not prevent the claimant from making an 
extra-contractual claim for damages, and the Court also confirmed that there was 
sufficient causation on the basis of the ‘more probable than not’ doctrine.
Agris Bitans, in his report for Lativa, addressed the legal basis for 
compensation of non-pecuniary loss caused by environmental pollution (in this 
case caused by a road traffic accident). In 2008, there was an accident near the 
claimants home involving the defendant s tractor; after the driver of the tractor 
lost control, the vehicle crashed into a metal barrier, spilling diesel and 9 tonnes 
of ammonium nitrate fertilizer onto land belonging to the claimants, as well as 
causing some structural damage to the house. The driver, an employee of the 
defendant, was punished under the Administrative Violations Code. An analysis by 
environmental experts found pollution of the claimant s soil and underground 
water, air pollution, and landscape degradation resulting from the accident. The 
water pollution in particular rendered the living conditions for the claimants 
unsanitary. The defendant’ s insurer paid an indemnification of EUR 1,500 as 
compensation for property damage in the form of damaged trees and the polluted
5 The present authors might be so bold as to contribute a comparative reference to the English 
case of Khorasandjian v. Bush [1993] QB 727 (and now the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997).
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soil, but the claimants sought compensation for their significant non-pecuniary 
loss in the form of mental and physical suffering resulting from the pollution. The 
legal basis for this claim was not clear, but the Latvian Supreme Court found for 
the claimants on the basis of Article 1635 of the Civil Law, and thus held the 
motor insurance company liable for the non-pecuniary harm as well.
A rather obnoxious criminal scheme perpetrated by a prisoner in Lithuania 
was the topic of Loreta Saltinyte's presentation. A prison inmate had illegally 
obtained a mobile phone and called the claimant, masquerading as a police officer 
and alleging that the claimant s mother was being held by the police. The 
conversation continued for two hours until the claimant was persuaded to make a 
payment of nearly LTL 13,000 (around EUR 3,700) to a third party (never 
identified) in order to secure the mother s release. The fraud was, of course, soon 
discovered, and despite a successful claim against the prisoner the claimant 
understandably wished to proceed against the state for failing to prevent the 
prisoner s access to the mobile and insufficiently supervising him. The Lithuanian 
Supreme Court accepted the principle that the state may be liable for such an 
omission but, in the absence of sufficient evidence, remitted the case for 
reconsideration. The second question before the court, whether the state was 
liable with the prisoner in solidum, was answered in the negative: Articles 
6.279(1) and 6.6(3) of the Civil Code only provide for solidary liability in cases 
where the whole or a distinct part of the damage is attributable to more than one 
person, and if the nature of causation between the conduct of the parties and the 
damage is identical. Hence, where the direct cause of damage is the conduct of 
one tortfeasor and the second tortfeasor contributes only indirectly, the liability of 
the tortfeasors is several, not solidary.
Giannino Caruana-Demajo demonstrated the problems in tort caused by a 
third-party cover-up of the sexual abuse of a minor in Malta. The claimant, a 
9-year-old girl, met her abuser (the first defendant) while making weekly visits to 
her grandfather. On multiple subsequent occasions, the abuser brought the 
claimant to his own flat and in several cases made her miss school in order to do 
so. The second defendant, a doctor, issued medical certificates at the request of 
the first defendant, which were used to excuse the claimant s absences from 
school to the satisfaction of the school authorities. The claimant suffered 
psychological harm and claimed damages. The lower courts had held the doctor 
liable in negligence, as he had issued the certificates on several occasions without 
even seeing the child, knowing that the abuser was not her legal guardian and 
thus in clear breach of the standards of his profession. The Maltese Court of 
Appeal quashed the judgment and found no liability. The judges argued that the 
cause of the harm was the abuse and not the certificate and, although the doctor 
had breached the standards of his profession, that alone is not sufficient for 
liability. Foreseeability is necessary and the second defendant could not have 
foreseen the use that the abuser made of the certificate. Caruana-Demajo 
disagreed with the judgment on the basis of four points. First, the doctor acted
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knowingly (albeit not maliciously). Second, although he could not foresee the 
particular outcome, it was clear to him that the rules that he broke are in place 
for a reason. Third, and consequently, he was in reality reckless rather than 
negligent. Fourth and finally, it is arguable that the degree of foreseeability 
required should be adapted to the level of fault demonstrated.
Jessy Emaus outlined a case from the Netherlands that touched upon two 
wider issues in Dutch tort law - the role of tort in remedying infringements of 
fundamental human rights and the circumstances in which compensation can be 
claimed for non-pecuniary loss. The case, decided by the Hoge R aad, concerned 
enormous time delays in an Egyptian citizen’s application and reapplication for a 
residence permit (and the objections he lodged against the rejections of those 
applications, themselves likewise rejected) and the use of tort law to redress the 
excessive length of those proceedings, which breached the applicant's 
fundamental rights.
Wrongful birth was at the centre of Magne Strandberg's Norwegian case. 
The claimant, not having been given the required amniotic fluid test for the 
disease during pregnancy, gave birth to a child with Down's syndrome. Had she 
been offered the test as she should have, the disease would have been discovered 
and the claimant would, she claimed, have terminated the pregnancy. She sought 
compensation from the Norwegian System of Patient Injury Compensation for 
psychological harm following the birth under the Norwegian Patient Injury 
Compensation Act (2001/53). That claim was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 
the basis of the arguments that all humans carry the same human dignity and that 
such damages are difficult to prove with regard to causation and assessment. 
According to Strandberg, the reasoning of the minority in the case, that the 
psychological problems were undoubtedly damage in Norwegian tort law and 
caused by a mistake at the hospital, should not be forgotten. He also noted the 
multitude of issues not raised in the judgment at all, including the lack of 
economic loss, the legal provisions pertaining to abortion, and ethical 
considerations in point.
Eva Baginska considered a case of misdiagnosis from Poland. The claimant 
had a stroke, originally diagnosed as a ‘common’ stroke, but which later 
developed into a serious brain failure. The family members attempted to convince 
the doctor to make a referral for a computerized tomography (CT) scan at another 
hospital (the first hospital did not have the relevant equipment), but these 
requests were rejected. After a dramatic deterioration in the patient's condition, 
the CT scan did go ahead two days later and the patient underwent life-saving 
surgery thereafter. Nevertheless, the patient was left seriously disabled and 
claimed compensation. In the opinions of two expert witnesses, the same brain 
damage would have occurred if the scan had been performed immediately upon 
the initial diagnosis, but that the omission to perform the scan certainly 
constituted a breach of the required procedures. In consequence, the Supreme 
Court dismissed the claim for personal injury but allowed the claim for the
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violation of the patient’ s right to health-care services that meet the requirements 
of medical science. As Baginska expanded, two distinct bases for the award of 
non-pecuniary damages were available: medical malpractice resulting in personal 
injury, leading to pain and suffering (Art. 445 Kodeks cywilny (KC)), and the 
infringement of a patient ’ s rights (Art. 4 of Patient Rights Act, ex 19a Medical 
Establishments Act). Although the doctor committed no error of diagnosis in the 
circumstances, the unjustified delay in performing diagnostic tests constituted a 
negligent violation of the patient s right to proper medical services.
Another case of wrongful life arose in André D ias Pereira’s report on 
Portugal, where a baby was born severely malformed. The mother succeeded in 
claiming EUR 200,000 from the defendant physician and clinic, but the disabled 
son ’ s claim was rejected by the Court of Appeal and the Portuguese Supreme 
Court. There is no action for ‘wrongful life ’ under Portuguese law, because there 
is no constitutionally guaranteed right to be born healthy. Moreover, the 
malformations were not caused by the defendants, and such claims could lead to 
absurdity, with a child attempting to sue the parents for failing to terminate the 
pregnancy. Pereira argued furiously against this decision on the basis, inter alia, 
of the clear violation of the doctor s duties to inform. The full report will be a 
fascinating read in the forthcoming Yearbook of European Tort Law 2013.
Christian Alunaru presented for Romania and covered a case that centred 
on events during the tremendous upheaval that accompanied Romania s shift to 
western democracy. The claimant sought to claim against the Ministry of National 
Defence and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in respect of the shooting of the 
claimant’ s son in December 1989, arguing that they should be held liable as 
principals for their agents acts. In the area where the shooting took place, there 
had been a mix of forces from the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (Militia), patriotic guards of various state companies, and armed 
civilians present, defending that zone. The military units had permitted a group of 
civilian demonstrators, including the claimant’ s son, to enter a courtyard and 
thus, according to the claimant, were under a protective duty towards that group. 
As Alunaru explained, several conditions would apply to such liability. First, a 
relevant ‘principal-agent relationship ’ must exist, whereby, by agreement, the 
agent recognize the authority of the principal to direct and control his activity - 
there is no such agreement with conscripted soldiers for the Ministry of National 
Defence. Military service being compulsory for Romanian men under Article 52, 
paragraph 2 of the Romanian Constitution then in force, the young soldiers 
merely fulfilled a constitutional duty of honour in the judgment of the court. 
Subordination was imposed by law to this end. Second, the damaging act must 
have been committed by the agent in the fulfilment of the function assigned by 
the principal. On this point, the Romanian High Court had found that this 
requires ‘a direct causal relationship or such connection that the function 
assigned to the agent would have decisively determined the commitment of the 
act . The Court held that this involves an implied condition that a principal can
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be held liable only if the agent can be identified. Different kinds of military 
personnel and soldiers were present when the claimant s son was killed, and, 
depending on the basis of the employment of any individual, the resultant 
position as regards the principal s liability will be different. The Ministry could 
not be held liable for conscripted soldiers and so the impossibility of establishing 
which agent committed the act caused the claimant s action to fail - the inability 
to identify the perpetrators was not imputable to the Ministry of Defence. Alunaru 
concluded that the High Court s solution is profoundly unjust, albeit based on 
case law, legislative provisions, and various opinions in the relevant literature.
Martin Hogg presented a Scottish case from tort law s more prurient 
underbelly. The pursuer and one of the defenders employees had had a brief 
sexual affair. At the relevant time, this employee was a social worker assigned to 
the pursuer, and it was he who ended the relationship. The pursuer alleged that 
she had suffered serious injury to her mental health and a number of pecuniary 
losses as a result of that romantic entanglement, seeking GBP 100,000 in 
damages from the defenders on the basis of vicarious liability and the defenders 
direct duty to protect her from their employee. The court rejected the claims, 
holding that the various duties argued on behalf of the pursuer would represent 
too impractical and onerous a burden on the employers; that in any event there 
was no reason to expect that the defenders should have appreciated that there was 
an improper sexual relationship and nothing could have been done to prevent the 
parties voluntary romantic conduct; that it was not fair, just, and reasonable to 
impose a duty on the employee not to begin such a relationship; that the 
employee did not intend to inflict harm; and that the conduct was outside the 
scope of employment. Hogg commented that these were novel arguments in 
Scottish courts and that it is probably desirable for courts to avoid imposing 
duties in relation to consenting adults and their romantic involvements (although 
the approach taken to vicarious liability and the course of employment was a strict 
and traditional one, whereas an analogy to the ‘close connection test used in 
child abuse cases is perhaps arguable).
Anton Dulak reported a noteworthy departure from the goal of 
compensation and the highest ever damages award for personal injury in Slovakia. 
The first claimant had undergone nasal surgery and suffered permanent and 
irreversible brain damage. It was alleged that, during the operation and period of 
post-operative care, the defendant hospital had committed a gross breach of their 
duties, which caused the damage. Compensation was sought by the first claimant 
for pain and suffering (EUR 90,000), reduced capacity for social life (EUR 
155,000), and immaterial injury (EUR 330,000). His parents and siblings 
(claimants two to five) sought compensation for immaterial injury of EUR 90,000 
each. To the first claimant, the first instance court made the maximum possible 
award for pain (EUR 17,942) and awarded EUR 181,666 and EUR 200,000 for 
the reduced capacity for social life and immaterial injury, respectively. The 
parents recovered EUR 90,000 each, and the siblings EUR 10,000 each. That
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judgment was upheld on appeal, with the court stating that, where the provisions 
on damages do not provide for sufficient satisfaction, claimants are not excluded 
from seeking further satisfaction under the general provisions on personality 
rights. Moreover, the grave fault of the defendant hospital would justify the 
amount awarded here, as the decisive goal of the Slovakian provisions is not only 
compensation but also prevention and sanction.
The question of assessment of damages in cases where one public authority 
expropriates property from another public authority was the topic of Barbara 
Novak’s report for Slovenia. The Slovenian state had expropriated by decision 
12,084 m2 of real estate from the claimant municipality in order to build a road. 
This road was then handed over to the municipality for management and 
maintenance. The municipality argued, however, that this transferral was not 
pecuniary compensation for the prior expropriation, as it did not obtain 
ownership of the road or the land it was built upon. The authority brought an 
action for pecuniary compensation. The Slovenian Supreme Court disagreed and 
found that the transfer of management represented a sufficient benefit for the 
municipality, as it could be evaluated in pecuniary terms. Novak questioned the 
decision, noting that the Court did not attempt to evaluate the level of benefit 
from management and whether this could really be equivalent to the right of 
ownership lost.
Liability in respect of Thalidomide in Spain was addressed by Albert Ruda. 
The drug, distributed under the label ‘Contergan ’ , was withdrawn from the 
Spanish market in 1962 leaving approximately 3,000 victims with severe birth 
defects. Claims by the victims could conceivably have been barred as a matter of 
limitation, given that 50 years had elapsed. However, according to recent 
decisions of Spanish courts, the drug results in general and progressive 
impairment of the victims and thus in continuing damage (daños continuados), 
rendering the prescription period irrelevant. Damages have been awarded in the 
sum of EUR 20,000 per percentage point of disability, a figure several times 
higher than that under the system for motor vehicle accident tariffs, although an 
appeal has been lodged. Difficulties remain, Ruda argued, in the approach taken 
to distinguishing types of damage.
Hákan Andersson, in his inimitable style, presented a Supreme Court case 
from Sweden involving a 13-year-old girl who, by setting fire to a department 
store, had caused EUR 4 million in property damage. The girl had at various 
times been under the care of the social authorities, who knew about her 
pyromaniacal tendencies, and it was these authorities who were sued and held 
liable when the child, released to stay with her mother for want of a place in an 
appropriate institution, set the fire. The essence of the case for Andersson lies in 
the principles relating to proof - the authorities ’ record-keeping over their 
involvement with the girl was critical in facilitating analysis of the facts - and in 
the social and ethical questions raised - where human dignity and integrity is
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involved, it would be wrong to consider only an economic risk analysis, which we 
might require public authorities to conduct.
Peter Loser took the stage for the final national jurisdiction, namely 
Switzerland, and considered condemnation of the Swiss limitation period in cases 
of injuries with long latency periods by the European Court of Human Rights. In 
the decision (before that court) in Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland of 11 
March 2014, a ten-year limitation period running from the date of the breach of 
obligation by the defendant was held to deprive the claimants of their Article 6 
rights under the Convention where this limitation barred their claims in respect of 
mesothelioma diagnosed in 2004, some 26 years after the end of the period of 
asbestos exposure. Loser explained that a new 30-year limitation period consistent 
with the Principles of European Contract Law and Draft Common Frame of 
Reference had been proposed but with problematic transitional provisions. The 
longer period is not supposed to apply where the old period had already expired 
by the time the new period takes effect; as Loser made clear, this will render no 
aid to mesothelioma suffers, whose claims, given the 1989 ban on asbestos, will 
generally still be time-barred. Pierre Widmer (Lausanne) responded, among 
others, to the report, remarking that a new absolute limit of 30 years still does 
not resolve the issue. In response, Loser stressed the importance of certainty.
With regard to developments in tort law in the EU, Thomas Thiede chose 
the case of Melzer v. M F Global UK for his presentation on the international 
consequences of the financial crisis. Thiede began by explaining that many 
investors have lost considerable sums in the wake of the crisis and are now 
attempting to hold anyone related to underperforming financial products liable 
and preferably in domestic courts. In his chosen case, the company Weise 
Wertpapier Handelsunternehmen (registered in Düsseldorf), solicited the 
claimant, Melzer (domiciled in Berlin), as a client. Weise opened an account for 
Melzer with MF Global UK (a brokerage house in London), which traded in stock 
market futures in return for corresponding fees. Subsequently, Melzer paid a total 
of EUR 172,000 into that account. The investment did not go as planned and MF 
Global UK repaid only EUR 920. Weise became bankrupt in Düsseldorf, and so 
Melzer brought proceedings against MF Global. Critically, he did so in tort before 
the Landgericht Düsseldorf in Germany. The question was whether the court in 
Düsseldorf - Weise ’ s principal place of business - was internationally competent 
to hear the claim against the London-based MF Global. In 1976, the ECJ held that 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation, according to which a person may be 
sued ‘in the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred ’ , must be 
understood to include both the place where the damage occurred and the place 
where the event giving rise to the damage took place. Hence, the defendant MF 
Global could be sued, at the choice of the claimant, in the courts at either of 
those places. With the former unavailable, as the claimant had put his funds into 
an account with the brokerage house in London, where they were lost, 
international jurisdiction was then only available for the wrongful acts committed
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by MF Global in Düsseldorf. The German courts assumed that MF Global and 
Weise acted as accomplices when committing the harmful act, basing jurisdiction 
on the German provisions of section 830 BGB and section 32 Code of Civil 
Procedure, according to which international jurisdiction may be based on 
infringements committed by any of the participants, since they may all be held 
mutually liable for such acts under section 830 BGB. The Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) disagreed and underlined that the rules regarding the 
special jurisdiction under Article 5 Brussels I Regulation must be ‘interpreted 
restrictively’ ; the link between the dispute and the place of the alleged 
participation of MF Global UK was too slim, and with the (other) participant not 
being implicated in the proceedings, the national court was in a rather poor 
position to take evidence and rule - thus, the Düsseldorf court was not 
competent.
Of course, one of the highlights of the Friday session are the concluding 
comparative remarks, this year delivered for the first time by Ernst Karner, Acting 
Director of the Institute for European Tort Law. The remarks aim to highlight 
common themes and make valuable links with developments in previous years. 
For 2013, Karner identified a number of general topics for closer scrutiny, the 
first being the protection of the environment and cultural heritage. According to 
Karner, tort law faces difficulties when it tries to tackle environmental harm; if 
common property - like the air, the sea, and the public soil - is polluted, nobody 
is entitled to sue because these goods are not allocated to any legal subject. As 
long as restitution in kind is at stake, such difficulties can be solved if the state - 
as the holder of general interests - is granted corresponding claims. In this 
regard, Karner suggested that Croatia could serve as a helpful model. Awarding 
damages, however, raises further problems because the impairment of the 
environment as such does not necessarily constitute a loss measurable in 
monetary terms.
A second field highlighted by Karner was public liability, which has been a 
perennial issue since the very first Annual Conference on European Tort Law. He 
noted a general trend towards increasingly rejecting the received principle that 
‘the King can do no wrong ; now state liability can even result from pure 
omissions (Karner highlighted the Swedish and Lithuanian cases discussed above 
in particular), but, it was stressed, the area gives rise to difficult questions of 
policy and a difficult relationship with political decision-making.
The third overarching topic singled was prescription, as evidenced by 
several cases mentioned above. Karner expanded that, although it is generally 
undisputed that tort claims must lapse after a period, the exact requirements are 
far from clear and continue to form the subject of legal disputes. In summary, 
Karner held, tort law must strive for the right balance between the protection of 
the victim and the need to keep the floodgates closed. Drawing on Häkan 
Andersson’s earlier comments, Karner stressed that it should never be forgotten
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that law is a humanistic science that should be handled by humans in the best 
interest of humans.
As ever, the entirety of the Saturday session was given over to examination 
of a single topic by a select group of commentators. This year’ s theme was ‘Cyber 
Torts ’ . Bernhard A. Koch gave a first insight into the topic, presenting the basic 
questions at hand. He found that problems associated with the use of, and access 
to, the Internet, as well as with the availability of information online, are 
manifold. This is evidenced by an abundance of cases on, for instance: malicious 
software, phishing, 419 scams, bullying, stalking, defamation, humiliation, ‘happy 
slapping ’ ,6 and denial-of-service attacks. An important question is what potential 
responses there are for those suffering as a result of such undesirable conduct - 
aside criminal sanctions, Koch submitted that action might be taken against the 
offender and/or an ISP, etc., within the boundaries of legitimate self-help and that 
there might be monetary and non-monetary responses for harm done or the 
restitution of benefits, including, for example, a right of reply. Such claims might 
be addressed against the primary wrongdoer, or third parties (such as service 
providers). Continuing, Koch considered whether any of these issues were truly 
new or else in essence just a new arena for established torts. Just because the 
Internet is involved does not necessarily mean that the conduct itself is, at its 
core, different from behaviour in classic offline interactions. Posting something 
online, it was argued, is not so dramatically different from disseminating 
information via newspapers if we focus on evaluating the harmful behaviour itself. 
Of course, some new issues might emerge, it was said, such as where harm results 
from interference with Internet access by flooding and blocking the victim s 
server with traffic. Moreover, problems regarding international jurisdiction and 
conflict of laws can often arise.
On the substance of a cyber-tort claim, Koch addressed the questions of 
what losses might arise and which of those are recoverable. In cases of 
interference with security software, control systems, or health-care networks, even 
bodily harm has to be contemplated - regarding the health-care network example, 
Koch found that a cyber-attack that puts patient lives at stake could be launched 
by almost anyone - as well as damage to property - it is conceivable that a purely 
digital command transmitted via the Internet could destroy or at least impair 
tangible property. Koch then finally broached issues relating to damage 
assessment; how, for instance, can the amount of productive time lost to spam be 
measured? The Internet, merely by virtue of its tremendous scale, presents many 
difficulties in this area.
The scene having been set, Ronen Perry stood to discuss comparative and 
economic analyses of liability for online anonymous speech. Perry mapped out
6 A trend involving filming acts of violence against strangers; footage is often uploaded to the 
Internet.
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four distinct models. First he outlined exclusive direct liability, such as that found 
in the United States, whereby wrongdoers bear the costs of the negative effects of 
their activities7 and are incentivized to take the desirable level of care (a model 
that can suffer because of under-deterrence caused by various factors, including 
high identification costs and anonymous participants with easy access who are 
essentially judgment-proof defendants). Second, exclusive indirect liability, seen 
for example in Israel, whereby a third-party (usually the host provider) would be 
liable (a model confronted with high monitoring costs, notwithstanding the fact 
that such monitoring may interfere with recent judgments of the CJEU regarding 
the Data Retention Directive,8 which then may result in over-deterrence). Third, 
a model of concurrent liability was mapped out by Perry (associated with the 
current EU position) and finally a form of residual indirect liability (as found in 
England of late) such that the speaker alone will be liable unless unidentifiable, at 
which point indirect liability is imposed on the providers. As became clear in the 
following discussion, the concurrent model would combine the disadvantages of 
both direct and indirect liability (over-deterrence and additional monitoring 
costs). Perry consequently favoured the residual model on the basis of its better 
economic credentials.
Following this, Steve Hedley ventured into the topic of ‘cyber-trespass ’ and 
introduced his audience to the US case law employing the concept, including, for 
example, cases of degradation or destruction of computing resources, or theft of 
services. Hedley then related its fall from favour due to the rise of alternative 
solutions, including contractual liability and situation-specific regulations. The 
ultimate question raised was whether a meaningful role remained for this concept, 
grounded in the metaphor of the Internet as a ‘place ’ .
Marten Schultz gave the final topical report on ‘Tort Law, Guerilla Warfare 
and the Promotion of Cyber Privacy’ . In his lecture, Schultz argued forcefully for 
civil responsibility to ‘save the internet and make the world a better place ’ . The 
structure ran as follows. First, Schultz outlined distinct problems regarding a lack 
of protection in cases of cyberbullying, abuse, and privacy violations in the digital 
arena. Second, he put forward a case that tort law was the best instrument for the 
victim to achieve justice, which would, thirdly, boost tort law leading, finally, to a 
web 3.0 - or as Schultz named it: ‘tortopia’ . As regards the first portion, Schultz’s 
argument was that cyberbullying and illegal online abuse are an enormous privacy 
problem, as strong social forces accentuate privacy violations and impair 
mechanisms of responsibility. As regards the second, criminal law - to which most 
victims turn for justice - was said to be insufficient, as substantive and procedural
7 So-called ‘negative externalities’ ; Perry stressed the failure to consider the positive effects 
(‘positive externalities ’ ) of providing speech platforms in the accounting under this model, 
including the benefits to advertisers and information providers.
8 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others.
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rules, costs, Internet competence failings, and the priorities and attitude of the 
judiciary lead to deficiencies in the aid, if any, provided to the victim. This led to 
the conclusion that it is for tort law to provide a cure. Schultz maintained that tort 
law would provide the only effective mechanism, as victims could take action 
themselves by suing abusers. This would eventually lead, it was argued, to a more 
responsible web, a web 3.0.
As always, a brief summary of proceedings at the Annual Conference is no 
substitute for the rich and rewarding final efforts of those national reporters 
published in the accompanying European Tort Law Yearbook. Case abstracts will 
subsequently be available in the European Tort Law database at 
www.eurotort.org. Furthermore, the papers from the special session, along with a 
revised version of the opening lecture, will be published during the course of 
2014 in the Journal o f European Tort Law (JETL). Next year’ s Annual 
Conference will take place from Thursday, 9 April to Saturday, 11 April 2015.
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